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Global trade in high-value agricultural products, such as fresh and processed 
fruits and vegetables (FFV), is increasing (Maertens and Swinnen, 2006). Especially 
in developing country exports these high-value products are gaining importance: their 
share in total agricultural exports from developing countries increased from 21% in 
1980 to 41% in 2000 (Aksoy and Beghin, 2005). Despite the fact that participation in 
international trade is generally recognized to favour economic development, a recent 
debate in the literature casts doubt on the beneficial effect of high-value agricultural 
trade for developing countries. It is argued that new product and process standards for 
food quality and safety imposed by high-income countries introduce new barriers for 
developing country exports and are diminishing the gains from trade (Augier et al, 
2005; Brenton and Manchin, 2002; Unnevehr, 2000). Moreover, some studies 
mention that high-value agricultural trade may do little for the fate of poor farmers as 
they are likely to be excluded from high-value supply chains while the rents in the 
chain are extracted by multinational companies and developing country elites (Dolan 
and Humphrey, 2000; Farina and Reardon, 2000; Reardon et al, 1999).     
   Empirical studies on the impact of high-value agricultural trade and tightening 
food standards have focussed on the question of poor farmers’ participation as 
primary suppliers in high-value food chains and have presented a mixed picture. 
Several studies indicate that because of tough quality and safety standards high-value 
horticulture production and marketing increasingly originates from large industrial 
estates and that small farmers are increasingly excluded as suppliers to high-value 
markets (E.g. Reardon et al., 2003; Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002; Weatherspoon et al., 
2001; Reardon and Barrett, 2000; Delgado, 1999; Key and Runsten, 1999; Gibbon, 
2003; Weatherspoon and Reardon, 2003; Dolan and Humphrey; 2000; Kherallah, 
  22000). Very different findings come from a study by Minten et al (2006) on 
Madagascar and by Minot and Ngigi (2004) on Kenya, which find that a large share 
of FFV exports from these African countries is grown by small farmers on a contract-
base. Apart from the contentious issue of poor farmers’ participation in high-value 
supply chains, also the welfare effects of such participation remains an unresolved 
matter – that has received less attention in the empirical literature. Some studies find 
that small farmers included as contracted-suppliers in high-value food chains do gain 
from this (e.g. Minten et al, 2006). However, the overall welfare effects of high-value 
FFV trade in terms of rural income mobility, income equality and poverty reduction 
have rarely been assessed and quantified. Humphrey, Mc Culloh and Ota (2004) argue 
that a shift away from smallholder FFV production towards estate production is likely 
to contribute to an enhanced poverty-reducing impact of high-value agricultural trade 
because of new employment opportunities on estate farms. Yet, empirical evidence of 
such welfare effects are lacking.   
This paper studies the welfare effects of high-value FFV exports from Senegal 
to the EU. We analyze how the structure of the export supply chain has changed in 
response to tightening food standards and investigate the impact for the local 
population. The study yields four important findings. First, we find that public and 
private food standards in the EU have lead to increased consolidation and increased 
vertical coordination in the FFV supply chain with a shift away from smallholder 
contract-based production to integrated estate production. Second, these structural 
changes have increased the participation of rural households, and especially poorer 
households, in the supply chains through wage employment on FFV estates. Third, we 
find that household participation in FFV export production, whether through contract-
farming or through estate wage employment, generates significant income gains. 
  3Fourth, high-value FFV trade has a major impact on rural poverty-reduction and the 
increasing prevalence of food standards is even enhancing this impact.  
The structure of the papers is as follows. In a next section we describe the 
supply chain for FFV exports from Senegal to the EU and the importance of food 
standards in that chain. In section three we illustrate how the data for this study have 
been collected. In section four we analyse how the structure of the FFV export supply 
chain and household participation therein has changed. We analyse the welfare effects 
of these changes on the basis of a comprehensive econometric model in section five 
and with a simulation model in section six. Finally, we present the main conclusions 
and implications from our study.   
 
High-value FFV exports from Senegal and EU Food Standards  
FFV play a central role in Senegal’s recent strategy of export diversification 
towards high-value export commodities. Exports of FFV from Senegal increased 
sharply over the past 15 years: from 2,700 ton in 1991 to 16,000 ton in 2005 (figure 
1).  The period of the sharpest growth was after 1997. During this period, the export 
of French beans alone increased from 3,300 ton to almost 7,000 ton. It now still 
represents almost half (42%) of the total volume FFV exports. Aside from beans, 
other major export crops include cherry tomatoes (23%) and mangoes (16 %).  
Apart from some small volumes exported to neighboring countries, FFV are 
exported to the EU; in particular to France (40%), the Netherlands (35%) and 
Belgium (16%). Senegal ranks fourth as an external supplier of French beans to the 
EU, after Morocco, Egypt and Kenya. A quality premium is paid for French beans 
from Senegal. The EU buys Senegalese beans at a price that is about 70% higher then 
for beans imported from Egypt or Morroco (Eurostat, 2005). In addition, the price per 
  4ton has increased – from 1,752 Euro in 2000 to 1,952 Euro in 2004 – while transport 
costs have decreased substantially due to a shift from air cargo to maritime transport. 
The validation of the label Origine Sénégal by the Senegalese government might have 
played an important role in this quality-upgrading.  
FFV exports to the EU have to satisfy a series of stringent public and private 
food quality and safety standards. First, the EU legislation imposes high public 
standards concerning food quality and food safety for FFV. These include (1) the 
common marketing standards for FFV
1; (2) phytosanitary measures such as maximum 
residue levels; (3) general hygiene rules based on HACCP control mechanisms; and 
(4) traceability requirements. These latter two requirements came into force since the 
General Food Law of 2002. Traceability regulations imply agro-food businesses 
within the EU to document from/to whom they are buying/selling produce such that 
products can be traced back to their origin in case of food safety problems. Food 
standards have become more stringent during the past years: e.g. new regulations 
concerning the phytosanitary treatment of wooden packaging material and maximum 
levels of contaminations by heavy metals apply since 2005 and 2002 respectively.  
Second, in addition to these public standards, many large trading and retailing 
companies have engaged in establishing private food standards that are even stricter. 
For example the Euro-Retailer Produce Working Group (Eurep) has engaged in 
adapting traceability (and other) standards into the EurepGAP certification protocols. 




                                                 
1 Commission Regulation (EC) No 912/2001, an amendment of EC No 2000/96, specifies a 
classification for French beans based on quality and size, and stipulates provisions concerning the 
presentation and marketing of the beans.  
  5The study area and data collection   
To measure the impact of these developments we collected information at 
three different levels. First, we collected statistics on horticulture production and 
exports from existing data sources and conducted a series of qualitative interviews 
with experts, stakeholders and organizations.  
Second, in April 2005, we conducted quantitative and structured interviews 
with nine of the 20 horticulture exporting companies in the Dakar region. This sample 
constitutes a mixture of firms recently entering the market and older companies, and a 
mixture of smaller and larger exporters who jointly represent 44 % of the exported 
volume French beans (table 1).  
Third, we organized a large household survey in Les Niayes – the main 
horticulture zone in Senegal from which the majority (over 90%) of exported French 
beans originate. The majority of the population in this area are horticulture farmers 
producing a large variety of vegetables for the local market and French beans for 
export. In August – September 2005, we implemented a quantitative survey that 
covered 300 households in 25 randomly selected villages in two administrative 
regions – Dakar and Thiès – in the research area. The sample includes 159 households 
who do not participate in the export supply chain for French beans and 141 
households who do participate. The latter group includes 82 households who have one 
or more household members employed as wage workers on agro-industrial FFV farms 
and 59 households who cultivate French beans on contract with an exporting company 
– and who might also have members employed as wage workers (24) or not (35). The 
sample was stratified on whether or not households hold a contract for French bean 
production, which resulted in and over sampling of these contract-farmers. To take 
into account the sampling design and draw correct inferences we use, in all 
  6subsequent analyses, sampling weights that are calculated with information gathered 
at the village level.  
In table 2 we present some key features of the household sample. There is a 
high degree of poverty among the sampled households: the average per capita 
household income is about 560,000 FCFA and 40% of the households live below the 
national rural poverty line of 181,770 FCFA a year
2 (table 2). However, the degree of 
poverty in the research area is much lower than the national poverty rate which is 
estimated at 48% for the country as a whole and at 57% for the rural population 
(République du Sénégal and Banque Mondial, 2004). Agriculture is by far the most 
important economic activity – constituting on average more than 70% of total 
household income. The average farm size among the sampled households is 4.6 ha, 
which is close to the national average of 4.3 ha in the survey year 1998/99 (Eastwood 
et al., 2006). About three fourths of the cultivated land is irrigated, either manually or 
with more advanced irrigation systems. Average household size is rather large with 16 
members, which is typical for African rural households who live in extended families. 
Another striking feature is the general low level of education: 80% of the sampled 
household-heads have no formal education at all.  
 
Impact of growth in high-value exports and standards 
Structural changes in the export supply chain 
The increasing and changing public and private food standards in the EU put 
pressure on FFV exporters in Senegal to stay up to date with the changing legislation 
and private standards and to make additional investments in order to comply with 
                                                 
2 The national rural poverty line for Senegal was calculated from the ESAM II survey (Enquête 
Sénégalaise auprès des Ménages) that was conducted in 2001-2002. This national rural poverty line of 
181,770 FCFA per year corresponds to 0.9669 USD/day and is hence close to the international poverty 
line of 1 USD/day (République du Sénégal and Banque Mondiale, 2004).   
  7those standards. These growing demands also increase the need for tighter 
coordination in the high-value chains and have lead to important structural changes in 
the export supply chain for FFV in Senegal, with major implications for the 
Senegalese farmers. Key structural changes in the supply chain are increased 
consolidation at the level of the agro-exporting industry as well as at the level of 
primary producers; and increased vertical coordination with downstream buyers in the 
EU as well as with upstream suppliers. This translates into a decreasing volume of 
French beans that is procured from small farmers and an increase in vertically 
integrated FFV estate production.  
 
Consolidation in the export sector 
In fact, since 2000, the export sector is increasingly concentrated with smaller 
exporters dropping out. In 2002, French beans were exported through 27 companies. 
This number decreased to 24 in 2004 and in 2005 only 20 firms remained. During the 
last season in 2005, the three largest companies exported two thirds of the total 
volume of French beans, while in 2002 their market share was slightly less than half. 
This consolidation is at least partly the result from increasing EU food standards.  
Because of financial constraints, only larger exporters are able to comply with 
stringent food standards. Since 1994, most exporters were organized in SEPAS 
(Syndicat des Exportateurs des Produits Agricoles). This organization coordinates the 
transport of FFV by plane or ship, provides market information – including 
information on food standards – and assists its members in the contact with overseas 
buyers. However, following the increasing EU standards, the seven largest FFV 
exporters founded the organization ONAPES (Organisation National des Producteurs 
Exportateurs de Fruits et Légumes de Sénégal) in 1999. One of their specific aims 
  8was to comply with traceability standards and become EurepGAP certified. Four 
ONAPES companies are in our sample. Among these firms one – Sepam – is 
EurepGAP and HACCP certified (since 2004). Two other ONAPES firms – Soleil 
Vert and Baniang – and one SEPAS firm – Agriconcept – are in the process of 
certification and made substantial investments for this in the past couple of years.  
The remaining exporting companies, mainly smaller companies, are not certified, not 
in the processing of becoming certified and not undertaking particular investments in 
the scope of certification.    
 
Increased vertical coordination 
Vertical coordination increased, both downstream and upstream. First, the 
FFV exporting companies – especially larger firms – increasingly engage in tighter 
coordination with downstream importers and wholesalers in the EU market. Smaller 
exporters deal with importers through indicative agreements on the supplied quantity, 
which are not binding for either of the parties. Larger exporters have recently changed 
from such indicative agreements to more binding contracts with overseas buyers, 
which specify a fixed (minimum) price, the quantity to be delivered, the time of 
delivery and sometimes also include pre-financing to the suppliers. Among the 
reasons mentioned by exporting companies to engage in such tighter coordination are 
the volatility of prices in the EU market and the incidence of produce refusal by 
importers.    
Second, to guarantee food quality and safety throughout the supply chain and 
to assure accurate timing of production and harvesting exporting firms – especially 
larger firms – increasingly rely on tighter vertical coordination with upstream 
suppliers of primary produce. This increased vertical coordination occurs in two 
  9ways. The first is through more elaborate production contracts and tighter 
coordination within those contracts. Contracts signed with small family farms are 
typically specified for one season and indicate the area to be planted (usually 0.5 or 1 
ha), all technical requirements and the price. As part of the contract, the firms provide 
technical assistance and inputs to the farmers; especially seeds and chemicals, 
sometimes also cash credit. Some firms go as far in contract-coordination as the 
complete management of fertilizer and pesticide application and daily or weekly 
inspection of the farmers’ fields. Also field preparation, planting and/or harvesting 
can be coordinated and financed completely by the exporting firm. Especially larger 
exporters provide pre-financing and apply tighter contract-coordination while smaller 
exporters leave management decisions to the farmers. The most extreme case of 
contract-coordination is Sepam, who manages the whole production on farmers’ land 
except for irrigation and harvesting.  
A second, and even more radical, change towards vertical coordination is the 
shift from contract-farming with smallholders to large-scale estate production on 
agro-industrial farms. Larger exporters are increasingly engaging in fully integrated 
estate production on land that they buy or rent. In fact, the ONAPES exporting 
companies have agreed among themselves that each member should seek to be 
present in the market every season with a volume of at least 200 ton FFV and that at 
least 50% of the volume should originate from the companies own estate production – 
a measure that is having a profound impact on the structure of the export supply 
chain. Three firms in our sample have already substantially reduced procurement 
through contract-farming with smallholders: from 100% in their first year of operation 
to respectively 60% and 20% in the last season (table 2), in favor of integrated estate 
production. The companies cited quality rather than quantity to be the reason for this 
  10change. Even firms that still fully rely on contract-farming mentioned fully integrated 
production to be an important strategy for compliance with food standards in the 
future and hence for the survival and growth of the firm.  
 
Increased household participation  
The participation of rural Senegalese households in high-value export markets 
increased dramatically. Our household survey data reveal that there has been a sharp 
increase in the overall participation of local households in the French bean export 
supply chain, from less than 10 % in 1992 to about 40 % in 2005 (figure 2). This 
increase has had major positive welfare implications for the rural population – as we 
will analyze in detail in the next sections. A simple comparison between participating 
and non-participating households already reveals that there is a large difference in per 
capita income: 391,000 FCFA for non-participants compared to 815,000 FCFA for 
participants.  
However, as a result of supply chain restructuring, the nature of increased 
household participation in the export chain, and its effects on household well-being, 
differed strongly in the 1990s from more recent years. During the second half of the 
1990s households increasingly participated in export production through contract-
farming (figure 2). In 2000, an estimated 24% of local households in the research area 
produced French beans on contract with an exporting firm. However, from 2000 
onwards, while household participation grew further, this was mostly through wage 
employment in the agro-industry while contract-farming decreased (figure 2). 
Employment in the French bean agro-industry has increased sharply from less than 
10% of local households in 2000 to 35% in 2005. Yet, at the same time, the share of 
contract-farmers among the local population decreased from 24% to 8.5%. The survey 
  11data indicate that in the period 2000-2005, 80 % of contract-farmers lost their 
contract. The firms with whom these farmers signed contracts either started their own 
estate production (e.g. Sepam and Soleil Vert) or exited the market. Among the 
reasons these farmers mention for the dissolution of their contract, 76% indicate the 
exporting firm to have ended the contract and do not always know the reasons why. 
Hence, in summary, participation of rural farm households in high-standards 
FFV production continues to increase but their role is shifting from contract-farmers 
to estate workers. A comparison of total and per capita income across households 
indicates that household income for estate wage workers is more than twice as high 
and for contract-farmers more than four times higher compared to the income of non-
participating households (table 3). This suggests the shifted nature of household 
participation has implications for the distribution of rural incomes. However, a more 
thorough analysis is need to attribute income differences to the participation in high-
value export supply chains; which is done in the next sections.  
  Finally, an important issue is which households are participating in high-value 
export production through contract-farming and through wage employment, and 
which households are excluded. As a result of increased standards and supply chain 
restructuring, the smallest contract-farmers – with less land and agricultural 
equipment (table 4) – were excluded from contract-farming. Yet, more and more 
poorer households were included as estate wage workers. The figures in table 3 
indicate that estate wage workers have less livestock and less non-agricultural 
equipment than non-participating households while there is no difference in 
landholdings, in the share of irrigated land and in agricultural equipment between 
those households. On the other hand, contract-farmers have higher landholdings, a 
higher share of irrigated land, more productive assets to cultivate the land and more 
  12livestock (table 3). Both contract-farmers and agro-industrial employees have more 
labor endowments and a larger share of them is found in the Dakar region. So, both 
relatively better-off households and poorer households are involved in high-value 
FFV production but the former rather through contract-farming and the latter through 
estate wage employment.  
 
Econometric analysis  
Selection and treatment bias  
The figures mentioned above suggest that household income for contract-
farmers and for agro-industrial employees is substantially higher than the income for 
non-participating households. However, based on a simple comparison of means in 
table 3, it is impossible to satisfactorily attribute these differences in income to the 
impact of contracts with exporters and of employment on FFV estates. Contract-
farmers might earn a higher income even if they had not participated in contract-
farming because they hold larger amounts of productive assets such as land and 
livestock. Similarly, households participating in agro-industrial wage employment 
might earn higher incomes because they have larger labor endowments. A regression 
model is needed to disentangle these effects. Moreover, there might be unobservable 
factors (managerial ability, household preferences, etc.) that simultaneously enhance 
household income and increase the likelihood of a household to have a contract or to 
be employed in the FFV industry. Due to this self-selection problem, OLS regression 
models would lead to biased estimates and a more advanced econometric technique is 
needed.  
We control for self-selection bias by using a treatment effects model 
(Wooldridge, 2001). We define a categorical variable that takes the outcomes m = 0, 
  131, 2, for three subgroups of households: non-participating households, estate wage 
workers, and contract-farmers respectively. For each subgroup of households, or for 
each treatment m:  
m m m m m X Y μ β α + + = ,   m = 0, 1, 2   (1) 
where Ym is the income of households receiving treatment m; and Xm a vector of 
exogenous variables assumed to affect household income. Because we are mainly 
interested in how income differs across m – measured by the coefficient α – and for 
simplicity, we restrict the model by imposing that β is equal across the different 
treatments. Using notation i to indicate individual households the model reduces to:     
i i i i X M Y μ β α + + =  (2) 
where the treatment variable Mi is a vector of dummy variables for each outcome m = 
0, 1, 2. Due to self-selection of treatment, Mi cannot be assumed to be exogenous and 
self-selection bias needs to be corrected for.   
The specified model differs from a standard treatment effects model in that the 
treatment variable has more than two possible outcomes. In a binary treatment effects 
model, the self-selection of treatment is corrected for with a propensity score – which 
is the conditional probability of treatment, usually estimated using probit or logit 
regression models – a method pioneered by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). Resolving 
the selectivity bias in our model with three possible outcomes of the treatment 
variable is more complex and we use a solution that has been proposed by 
Bourguignon, Fournier and Gurgand (2002)
3. These authors show that the coefficients 
                                                 
3 Lee (1983) first described a method to the case where selectivity is modeled as a multinominal logit 
but as shown by Bourguignon et al. (2002) the results rely on fairly restrictive assumptions. 
Bourguignon et al. (2002) provide an alternative method for selectivity bias correction based on a 
multinominal logit model under the usual parametric assumptions. The selectivity correction function 
proposed by Bourguignon et al. (2002) involves all correlation coefficients between the disturbance 
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in equation (3): 





s m m m m m m P q
P
P







+ + + = ∑
≠ 1
 (3) 
with Pm the conditional probability of treatment m and q(Pm) an integral function of 
this probability. The probabilities Pm are conditioned by a set of exogenous variables 













) | (    (4) 
From estimating the MNL model (4) we derive the fitted probabilities Pm for 
each treatment m; we use these to construct selectivity correction functions for each 
treatment as in equation (3); include these functions in equation (2) and consistently 
estimate the coefficients α and β by least squares. With this method we obtain 
consistent estimators of the coefficients in the model but not of the standard errors as 
the two-step nature of the procedure is not accounted for in the least squares 
regression. Therefore, as proposed by Bourguignon, Fournier and Gurgand (2002), we 
use a bootstrap method to get robust standards errors and hypothesis testing.  
  The estimation of the treatment effects model in a two-stage procedure does 
not only address the issue of selection bias in correctly estimating the income effects 
but also yields insights into the determinants of household participation in high-value 
export production through contract-farming and estate wage employment. Both 
issues, the determinants of household participation and the effect of participation on 
household income, are important for analyzing the income and equity effects of trade 
in high-value commodities.   
                                                                                                                                            
term of the outcome equation of interest and the disturbance terms of all categorical latent expressions 
in the multinominal logit model whereas this is not the case in the method proposed by Lee (1983).  
 
  15Expected effects and hypotheses 
Our main interest is in the coefficients α1 and α2 of the two dummy variables 
m1 and m2 representing agro-industrial wage laborers and contract-farmers 
respectively. We hypothesize that both have a positive effect on Y or, in other words, 
that high-standards export production has a positive effect on rural incomes, whether 
it is realized through estate farming and associated rural employment or through 
contract-farming with smallholders. Other variables in the second stage of the model 
are a vector of exogenous variables X that are assumed to affect household income. 
These include physical assets – the area cultivated (land), the share of land under 
irrigation (irrigation), total livestock holdings (livestock), the value of farm and non-
farm equipment (eq_agr and eq_nonagr) – and households’ labor endowments 
(labor). As these productive endowments increase the income generating capacity of a 
household, we expect all these variables to have a positive effect on Y. We 
additionally include unearned income (inc_unearned) as an explanatory variable in 
the regression as this directly increases income irrespective of households’ productive 
endowments. 
In the first stage MNL model, the probability of household participation in 
contract-farming and estate wage employment is conditioned by a vector of 
exogenous variables Z. We include the following variables as elements of Z: land, 
irrigation, livestock, eq_agr, eq_nonagr, labor, education – the education level of the 
household, and region – a dummy variable for location in the Dakar region. In the 
literature it is often mentioned that processing and exporting firms prefer to contract 
with larger farms – as this reduces transaction costs – and with wealthier and better 
educated farmers – as these require less financial and technical assistance from the 
contractor-firm (Swinnen, 2005). Based on this argumentation, we expect the 
  16variables land, irrigation, eq_agr, labor and education to increase the probability of 
contract-farming relative to no participation. The variable region is expected to have a 
positive effect in both equations of the multinominal logit model. Most FFV exporters 
are located in the Dakar region and therefore transaction costs related to contract-
farming and transport costs related to estate employment are smaller for households 
living in this region.    
    
Results and discussion 
The results of the two stage estimation procedure are given in table 5 - the first 
stage MNL regression – and table 6 – the second stage OLS regression corrected for 
selectivity bias.  
 
Explaining household participation in high-standards production  
The results of the first stage MNL regression confirm that contract-farming is 
biased towards better-off (albeit still small) farmers with more productive assets while 
wage employment on FFV estates is undertaken by rather poorer, larger and lower 
educated households. This results directly from the estimated effects. First, 
households with more labor, more land and a higher share of irrigated land have a 
higher probability to be involved in FFV contract-farming with an exporting firm 
(table 4). So, FFV contract-farmers are the relatively better-off households among the 
rural smallholder population with more land and access to an irrigation system. 
Second, households with more labor, a lower education and less productive 
equipment have a higher probability of being involved in wage employment on FFV 
estates (table 4). Hence, wage employment on FFV estates is not directed to better-off 
households but rather to poorer and lower educated households.  
  17These findings imply that household participation in the high-value export 
supply chain for French beans did not only increase sharply – as discussed above 
(figure 2) – but also turns out to be more equitable with the shift from smallholder 
contract-farming to integrated estate farming and associated employment after 2000. 
Despite the fact that the smallest farmers among the contract-farmers are excluded 
from French bean contract-farming; participation in this high-value export supply 
chain became more equitable as it includes more and poorer households as wage 
workers on agro-industrial estates.        
The results empirically validate, on the one hand, the often heard argument in 
the literature that the smallest and poorest farmers are excluded from high-standards 
contract-farming and the benefits thereof (e.g. Reardon et al., 2003; Weatherspoon 
and Reardon, 2003; Kirsten and Sartorius, 2002; Reardon and Barrett, 2000; Gibbon, 
2003; Weatherspoon et al., 2001; Farina and Reardon, 2000; Kerrallah, 2000; 
Delgado, 1999; Key and Runsten, 1999; Reardon et al., 1999) and on the other hand 
provide more general insights. The main reasons mentioned in the literature for the 
exclusion of the smallest farmers from high-value contract-farming are the high 
transaction costs in dealing with many small farmers and the difficulties in monitoring 
quality and safety standards (Key and Runsten, 1999; Swinnen, 2005). Our analysis 
shows that indeed smaller contract-farmers were excluded as a result of increased 
food standards and supply chain restructuring but that this is only a partial outcome. 
The overall outcome is an increased participation of rural households and of poorer 
households in high-standards supply chains, not through contract-farming but through 
agro-industrial employment.  
    Other effects in the MNL regression have the expected sign but are 
statistically not significant, except for the positive effect of the dummy variable 
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firms – increases the probability of participating in high-value export production, 
whether through contract-farming or through wage employment, and indicates that 
transport and transaction costs are important in explaining participation in high-value 
export production.   
 
Impact of participation in high-standards production on household income 
The results of the second stage regression model show that participation in 
high-value FFV production, whether through estate wage employment or through 
contract-farming, significantly increases household income. After correction for 
selectivity bias we find that FFV estate workers and contract-farmers have incomes 
that are respectively 1.4 million and 3 million FCFA higher than for non-participating 
households (table 6) – or respectively about 60% and 120% higher than the average 
household income in the region
4.   
These highly significant and large effects on household income demonstrate 
that rural households involved in high-value supply chains, do share in the gains from 
high-value export production. This is a key empirical finding as it has repeatedly been 
argued in the literature that the gains from high-value agricultural trade are captures 
by foreign investors and developing country elites (e.g. Dolan and Humphrey, 2000; 
Farina and Reardon, 2000; Reardon et al, 1999). Especially contract-farming has often 
been criticized to be a tool for agro-industrial firms and food multinationals to exploit 
unequal relationships with farmers and extract rents from high-value supply chains 
(Warning and Key, 2002). However, some recent empirical studies have demonstrated 
                                                 
4 The income effect of contract-farming is significantly larger than the income effect of estate wage 
employment. There are many possible explanations for this that could be explored in a more detailed 
analysis.   
 
  19the beneficial effect of contract-farming (e.g. Swinnen, 2005; Dries and Swinnen, 
2004) and high-value agricultural trade (e.g. Gulati et al., 2006; Minten et al., 2006) 
for rural households in low-income countries. Our case-study from Senegal does not 
only add to this recent empirical evidence but additionally demonstrate that high-
value agricultural trade benefits rural incomes even if it is realized through integrated 
estate farming and associated rural employment rather then through contract-farming. 
This result challenges the implicit assumption underlying some empirical studies that 
high-standard food production needs to integrate farm households as primary 
suppliers in the value chain if such production needs to benefit rural incomes. Our 
results show that also households involved as wage workers reap significant, albeit 
smaller, benefits from high-value agricultural production than contract-farmers do.     
Finally, the coefficients of all other variables in the second stage regression 
have the expected sign and are statistically significant, except for the variable 
livestock. Households with more land, a higher share of irrigated land, more farm and 
non-farm equipment, and more labor
5 have higher incomes. A possible explanation 
for the insignificant effect of livestock holdings on household income is that it is 
important as a store of wealth rather than a productive asset in the research region.  
 
Overall welfare effects 
The findings from the econometric analysis demonstrate that high-value 
agricultural trade significantly adds to rural incomes but that the effect is smaller if 
household participation in the high-value supply chain is realized through estate wage 
employment rather then through contract-farming. Moreover, we find that contract-
farming is biased towards relatively better-off farmers while wage employment on 
                                                 
5 Labor endowments have a positive but decreasing effect on household income. A plausible 
explanation for this is the existence of intra-household free-riding in larger households.  
  20FFV estates is undertaken by rather poorer households. Hence, the overall welfare 
effects for the local population in terms of an equitable distribution of income and 
poverty reduction are still ambiguous.   
To understand the overall welfare implications of high-value agricultural 
trade, increased EU food standards and subsequent supply chain restructuring in 
Senegal, we simulate household income based on the estimated coefficients α and β 
(equation 2), for two hypothetical cases. In the first case both treatments m – contract-
farming and estate wage employment – are set to 0, which corresponds to the case if 
there would be no French bean exports at all. For the second case treatments m are set 
according to household participation in contract-farming and estate wage employment 
in 2000. This second case simulates a situation in which there would have been no 
further expansion of French bean exports after 2000, no supply chain restructuring 
and in which the sector is dominated by smallholder contract-production. This case 
resembles the absence of increasing EU food standards and subsequent changes
6.   
For these two hypothetical cases we estimate total household incomes based 
on the estimated coefficients in the previous regression model, use these estimates to 
calculate per capita incomes and derive poverty indicators and compare the results 
with the actual situation. The results of this simulation, displayed in table 7, are 
striking. First, high-value export horticulture reduces poverty by 17% in the research 
area. Without the possibility for rural households to participate in high-value FFV 
contract-farming and wage employment on FFV estates, the incidence of poverty in 
the region would have been 57 % – which equals the average rural poverty rate for 
Senegal – while actual poverty is only 40% (table 7). This is an extremely large and 
                                                 
6 This simulation might suffer from overestimation as well as underestimation of household income. 
On the one hand, in the absence of increasing food standards French bean exports from Senegal might 
have grown faster and hence benefited more households. On the other hand, without strict food 
standards there might have been no quality upgrading and price increases in French bean exports and 
hence income gains would have been lower.   
  21important effect; much larger than the overall reduction in rural poverty in Senegal 
from 66% in 1995 to 57% in 2002 (République du Sénégal and Banque Mondiale, 
2004). The welfare impact of agricultural trade for poor households in developing 
countries has been debated a lot but not many studies have been able to quantify that 
effect as we have done here.    
  Second, we find that increased EU food standards and the subsequent shift 
away from smallholder contract-farming in favor of integrated estate farming has 
further contributed to an increased poverty-alleviating impact of high-value 
agricultural trade. The simulated case without increased food standards and supply 
chain restructuring results in a poverty rate of 44%, which is 4% higher than the 
actual incidence of poverty (table 7). This is again an extremely important empirical 
finding. Increasing food standards and a shift away from smallholder production are 
generally seen as particularly detrimental for the poverty situation in developing 
countries (e.g. Farina and Reardon, 2000; Kherralah, 2000; Reardon et al, 1999). Our 
findings for Senegal challenge this view and empirically prove that increased food 
standards can even enhance poverty reduction.     
  Third, high-standards exports do not only decrease the incidence of poverty, it 
also sharply decreases the severity of poverty. If there would have been no French 
bean exports, the poverty-gap-ratio in the region would be 1.43 while the actual 
poverty-gap-ratio is 0.66 (table 7). Moreover, the poverty-gap-ratio would have been 
much higher in the absence of increased food standards and subsequent supply chain 
restructuring. This means that on top of households moving out of poverty, high-value 
trade, food standards and the shift to estate farming also contribute to poor households 
moving closer to the poverty line. This adds to the previous findings and indicates that 
  22more people are likely to evade poverty if high-standards exports can be sustained or 
expanded in the future.  
Fourth, high-value trade increases average total and per capita income. Actual 
average per capita income is about 570,000 FCFA while it would have been only 
about 400,000 FCFA if households would not have the possibility to participate in 
high-value export production (table 7). However, a situation where export production 
is largely based on smallholder-contract production – as it was before food standards 
induced structural changes in the supply chain – would slightly increase average 
income to 600,000 (table 7). This difference is statistically not significant and is very 
small as against the huge reduction in poverty.  
  
Implications  
The results from our study show that high-value agricultural trade significantly 
benefits rural incomes and importantly contributes to reducing rural poverty. The 
analysis further shows that, contrary to the conventional arguments in the literature, 
increased food standards have resulted in a more equitable distribution of the income 
gains from trade among the rural smallholder population and in an enhanced poverty 
reduction. These findings imply that high-value agricultural trade – increasingly 
subject to stringent food standards – is an engine of pro-poor economic growth in 
developing countries. A key policy message is that developing countries should seek 
to be included in these high-value, high-standards supply chains.  
The recent literature pays much attention to food standards imposed by high-
income countries as technical (and scientifically justified) barriers for developing 
countries and for small businesses and poor farmers in these countries to participate in 
and gain from high-value trade. Our case-study however, demonstrates that increased 
  23food standards do not necessarily lead to the exclusion of the weakest players in the 
supply chain but can entail new opportunities for the rural poor and actually be a 
catalyst for enhanced welfare. Increasing food standards undoubtedly put pressure on 
food supply chains and therefore an emphasis on supply chain dynamics is essential 
for exploiting new opportunities. Governments can play a proactive role in this: e.g. 
by refraining from policies that impede agro-businesses strategic responses and 
supply chain restructuring; by facilitating and promoting investment in high-value 
agro-industrial sectors; by paying attention to the strategic location of agro-businesses 
in poverty-prone areas, etc. 
 
Conclusion  
In recent years the FFV export sector in Senegal became increasingly 
concentrated at the level of the agro-exporting industry as well as at the level of 
primary producers, and increasingly vertically coordinated with downstream buyers in 
the EU as well as with upstream suppliers. There has been a shift away from 
smallholder contract-based production towards production on estate farms owned by 
large exporting companies.  These structural changes in the FFV supply chain are 
(partially) driven by intensified public and private food standards in export markets.   
Based on conventional arguments in the literature, one could expect these 
recent developments to be particularly bad from a rural development and pro-poor 
growth perspective. The comprehensive econometric analysis in this paper shows that 
this is not all the case. We find that with the restructuring of the supply chain, more 
households and more poor households participate in and share in the gains from high-
value export agriculture through wage employment on vertically integrated estate 
  24farms. These new opportunities have enhanced the equitable distribution of rural 
incomes and the poverty situation in the research area.  
The overall conclusion of our study is that high-value agricultural production 
and trade – increasingly subject to stringent food standards – entails important 
opportunities for pro-poor economic growth in developing countries while and that an 
emphasis on supply chains dynamics is essential for exploiting these opportunities.  
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Soleil Vert 800 1100 2000 ONAPES
1 
Sepam 883 1410 1992 ONAPES 
Master 68 0 1989 ON
Baniang 80 150 1999 ONAPES 
Agriconcept 100 80 2002 SEPAS
2
ANS Interexport 64 0 2001 SEPAS
Pasen 30 0 2000 SEPAS
Agral Export 180 0 1992 SEPAS
PDG 173 239 1993 SEPAS
2 SEPAS – Syndicat des Exportateurs des produits Agricoles 
1 ONAPES – Organisation National des Producteurs Exportateurs  de Fruits 
et Légumes de Sénégal










Source: Authors interviews 
 
Table 2: Changes in procurement system of selected agro-exporting firms 
1




farms     
(< 10 ha)
commercia
l farms    
(> 50 ha)
Soleil Vert 100 20 40 1
Sepam 100 60 50 2
Master 50 40 n.a. n.a.
Baniang 85 85 n.a. n.a.
Agriconcept 30 30 n.a. n.a.
ANS Interexport 100 100 50 0
Pasen 100 60 8 0
Agral Export 100 100 30 0
PDG 100 100 45 0
n.a.: data not available
% of supply from 
contract-farming




Source: Authors interviews 
 
  29Table 3: Household characteristics for participants and non-participants in FFV 






(N=297) (N=156) (N=141) (N=82) (N=59)
Income 
income  Total household income (1000 FCFA) 2,471 1,467 3,970 3,384 6,100
inc_capita Income per capita**** (1000 FCFA) 561 391 815 639 1,453
Physical assets 
land Cultivated area (ha) 4.612 4.351 4.999 4.427 7.046
irrigation Share of land under irrigation (%) 75.0 73.6 77.0 74.7 85.1
livestock Livestock holdings (units *) 2.109 2.064 2.175 1.651 4.047
eq_agr Value of farm equipment (1000 FCFA) 137.4 130.7 147.5 116.0 260.1
eq_nonagr Value of non-farm equipment (1000 FCFA) 45.06 64.64 15.96 9.44 39.27
Human capital 
labour Labour endowments ** 7.423 6.724 8.461 8.476 8.407
education Dummy for primary education *** 0.635 0.635 0.636 0.634 0.644
Location
region Dummy for Dakar region 0.563 0.506 0.648 0.659 0.610
* One livestock unit equals 1 cow, 0.8 donkey and 0.2 sheep or goat 
** Labour endowments include all household members between the age of 12 and 60 who are able to work
*** Education is 1 for household-heads or any other member in the household having finsihed primary education







Source: Authors survey    
 




land Cultivated area (ha) 3.924 7.046
irrigation Share of land under irrigation (%) 81.2 85.1
livestock Livestock holdings (units *) 2.755 4.047
eq_agr Value of farm equipment (1000 FCFA) 139.5 260.1
eq_nonagr Value of non-farm equipment (1000 FCFA) 47.83 39.27
Human capital 
labour Labour endowments ** 7.918 8.407
education Dummy for primary education *** 0.673 0.644
Location
region Dummy for Dakar region 0.653 0.610
* One livestock unit equals 1 cow, 0.8 donkey and 0.2 sheep or goat 
contract-farmers: 
** Labour endowments include all household members between the age of 12 and 60 who are able to work
*** Education is 1 for household-heads or any other member in the household having finsihed primary education
Variables Description
 
Source: Authors survey 
  30Table 5:   Explaining participation: 1
st stage regression results from a 
multinominal logit model  
Number of obs 297
F(  16,    280) 3.7200
Prob > F 0.0000
Variables  Coefficient odds ratio Std. Err. t statistic
AGRO-INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT (m=1)
land 0.0059 1.0059 0.0351 0.17
irrigation 0.0006 1.0006 0.0038 0.16
livestock -0.0386 0.9622 0.0476 -0.81
eq._agr -0.0004 0.9996 0.0007 -0.5
eq._nonagr. -0.0018 0.9982 0.0009  -2.03** 
labour 0.2271 1.2549 0.0500  4.54*** 
education -0.4470 0.6396 0.3255 -1.37
region 0.8368 2.3090 0.3250  2.57***
constant -2.4741 0.5825 -4.25
CONTRACT_FARMING (m=2)
land 0.0856 1.0894 0.0287   2.98***
irrigation 0.0116 1.0117 0.0055  2.13**
livestock 0.0236 1.0238 0.0257 0.92
eq._agr 0.0006 1.0006 0.0006 0.96
eq._nonagr. -0.0003 0.9997 0.0006 -0.57
labour 0.1367 1.1465 0.0605  2.26**
education -0.0308 0.9696 0.3813 -0.08
region 0.9932 2.7000 0.3815  2.6***
constant -5.0504 0.6989 -7.23
Significance level: *** 1%; ** 5%; *10%; and ° 15%
The outcome no participation (m=0) is used as the basecategory; the estimated 
coefficients of the other outcomes (m=1 and m=2) have to be interpreted relative to 
the basecaterory 
 
Source: Author survey  
 
 
  31Table 6:   Impact of participation on income: 2
nd stage regression results from 





Std. Err. t statistic Std. Err. t statistic
unearned income 0.926 0.051    18.01*** 0.405   2.28**
land 325.6 171.8  1.89* 45.94    7.09***
irrigation 22.61 14.30  1.58° 3.572    6.33***
eq._agr 3.925 3.825 1.03 1.300   3.02**
eq._nonagr 3.722 4.512 0.82 2.088  1.78*
livestock -35.85 178.7 -0.20 47.38 -0.76
labour 887.0 557.3  1.59° 197.9    4.48***
labour
2 -57.26 36.65   -1.56° 12.04   -4.76***
m 1 (wage employment) 1,419 827.5 1.72* 269.8    5.26***
m 2 (contract-farming) 3,051 1,257 2.43** 221.9    13.75***
corr_funct_m1 16,868 22,165 0.76 8,653  1.95*
corr_funct_m2 -11,360 31,964 -0.36 14,350 -0.79
corr_funct_m3 6,778 8,952 0.76 2,789   2.43**
corr_funct_m12 43,205 94,805 0.46 40,512 1.07
corr_funct_m13 -4,481 50,383 -0.09 17,080 -0.26
corr_funct_m23 -5,952 62,903 -0.09 25,145 -0.24
constant -738.2 125,602 -0.01 51,870 -0.01
Significance level: *** 1%; ** 5%; *10%; and ° 15%
Number of obs
F(  16,    280)
Prob > F
R-squared
1 To account for the two-step nature of the procedure, standard errors are estimated using the bootstrap 
method with 50 bootstrap replications and bootstrap samples seleceted within each stratum of the 
original survey design.
Note: the selectivity correction functions, corr_func_mx, to account for self-selection bias of treatment 
m=0, 1, 2 were calculated from a multinomnial logit model.
Variables Coefficient Bootstrap estimates
1 OLS estiamtes
 
Source: Author survey  
 




av. per capita 
income
(1,000 FCFA) (1,000 FCFA)
Scenerio A 1,831 401 57% 1.44
Scenerio B 2,610 600 44% 1.22
Actual situation 2,545 573 40% 0.66
Scenerio A: no French bean exports at all 






Source: Author survey  
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Figure 1:  Exported volume (1,000 ton) of horticulture products from Senegal, 











































horticulture products green beans
 
Source: calculated from DH – Direction de l’Horticulture ( 2005) 
  33Figure 2:  Share of households participating in French bean production through 
































contract-farming wage employment total 
 
The figure is based on recall data from a sample of 300 households in 2005. To account for 
demographic effects, households for which the household head did not reach the age of 25 in 
a particular year and households who migrated to the area only after a particular year were 
excluded from the figures for that year. To account for biases due to sampling design, 
sampling weights were used in the calculations.    
Source: Calculated from survey data  
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